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1. Principal Findings. 
This section lists the principal findings gleaned from an analysis of the FBE H objective 
data. The findings are divided into three groups, the groups are: 
Operational. Findings related to participant actions. 
Experimental Methodology. Findings related to the way the experiment was designed and 
the way the experimental procedures were defined. 
Process. Findings related to the experiment system architecture and its operation. 
1.1. Operational Findings. 
Sixty-three percent of TST target nominations were engaged. This result is similar to that 
in FBE F and FBE G. 
A plurality of targets were engaged with LASM (46 percent). 
The San Jacinto conducted 79 percent of all engagements. 
A high percent of missions (including both TST and MTO) called for engagements with 
multiple rounds (45 percent) but in only three cases were the rounds given individual aim 
points. Of the eight LASM missions that called for multiple rounds, only three cases 
fired the required number of rounds. 
A large fraction of TST missions (30 percent) were fired unmensurated. 
For GISRC the median interval from target acquisition to transmission of the target 
nomination to LAWS and JTW was 5.1 minutes (mean time was 8.6 minutes). 
For JTW the median interval between receipt of the mensuration request and transmission 
of the mensuration target position was 4.5 minutes (mean time was 7.9 minutes). 
For LAWS the median interval between receipt of the target nomination at LAWS until 
the issuance of the fire when ready command was 14.5 minutes (mean time was 22.6 
minutes). 
For RPM the median time from receipt of a TLAM or TTLAM route request until 
transmission of the completed route for a TST target was 80 seconds (mean 79.9seconds). 
Few, if any, targets with dwell times of 30 minutes or less were successfully engaged. 
BDA data, as manually entered into the DTF, were often inconsistent with the LAWS 
engagement information. 
1.2 Experiment Methodology Findings 
The rate of target nomination, determined from the nominations that appear in LAWS, 
was low (24.8/day including both MTO and TST nominations). But there is evidence 
that a significant number of nominations did not reach LAWS (see Section 1.2). 
Calculated target Not Later Than (NLT) times are often not realistic. NLT times need to 
be determined based on the knowledge of the state of individual targets. 
The San Jacinto engaged 48 percent of its MTO targets. MTO targets were often 
furnished with no or erroneous and unmensurated target positions. The MTO 
engagements were fired unmensurated. There was no interaction between the MTO and 
TST tasking. 
1.3 Process Findings 
Of those nominations logged as sent by GISRC, 30 percent do not appear in LAWS. Of 
those nominations logged by JTW, 44 percent do not appear in LAWS. There were five 
instances where JTW reported a target mensurated but the mensurated data do not appear 
in LAWS. A mechanism to verify the receipt of nominations and other messages within 
the DFN is required. 
For RPM the median time from receipt of a TLAM or TTLAM route request until 
transmission of the completed route for MTO missions was median 177.5 seconds with a 
mean of 321 -5 seconds. The corresponding figures for TST targets were 80 and 79.9 
seconds. The MTO mission times were much higher because of the near simultaneous 
request for many TTLAM routes resulting in the queuing of requests, route requests 
remained in the queue for a maximum of 960 seconds. A single RPM workstation is 
inadequate for high engagement intensity. 
The great majority of weapon firings (at least 77 percent of the engagements) were not 
sent to, and not fired, flown out, or impacted in JSAF. This had a significant impact on 
the engagement timeline and utilization of assets due to the delay in target assessment 
and BDA. 
Despite an effort to introduce time synchronization to FBE H there is evidence 
synchronization was not achieved. This synchronization is necessary to characterize 
DFN latencies and construct engagement timelines 
Latencies in the transmission of: nominations to LAWS and JTW, UAVSim video to 
GISRC and updates among the LAWS nodes, at times, significantly affected engagement 
timelines. 
DTFs do not log the time and source of each update. The DTFs do not contain target 
engagement data (e.g. weapon employed, time of fire, time of impact). 
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2. TST Engagements 
In FBE F and G the missions that appeared in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires 
display were limited to TST missions. In FBE H, the LAWS data included some MTO 
targets in addition to the TST targets. In many cases, a target was identified as an MTO 
target in the LAWS remarks, in other cases the MTO nature of the target was deduced 
from the fact it was nominated by the San Jacinto LAWS workstation rather than a 
GISRC work station. The following discussion refers only to the TST targets unless 
otherwise stated. 
Table1 summarizes the engagement data for TSTs in Phase I of FBE H. The nomination 
rate in FBE H was low with an average of 19 nominations per day (including the MTO 
nominations the value goes up to 24.8 nominations per day) compared to 40.6 
nominations per day in FBE G. Of the 76 TST targets nominated, 48 (63%) were 
engaged. The engagement rate in FBE H is similar to that in FBE F (53%) and FBE G 
(5 6%). 
The nominations examined are those that appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: 
Fires display. As will be discussed later (see Sections 5.2 and 7. l), there is evidence that 
many nominations do not appear in LAWS. A small number of nominations that were 
described as test cases or inadvertent duplicates have been excluded from the analysis. 
The breakdown of weapon types assigned to the TST engagements are listed below: 
LASM 45.9% FASM 2.1% 
ERGM 31.3% TACAIR 2.1% 
TTLAM 18.8% 
The choice of weapons shifted dramatically with respect to FBE G. In particular, the 
TST targets against which TTLAM/TLAM were employed dropped from 44.9 % in FBE 
G to 18.8 % in FBE H. In FBE G, LASM was employed against 15.1% of the TSTs 
while in FBE H the corresponding figure is 45.9%. The differences in employment 
extend beyond these numbers. In FBE G many of the TTLAMs were fired into loiter 
boxes (35%), in FBE H, howeyer, only TTLAM one targeted to a loiter box. In FBE H, 
all LASM missions specified a single missile, In FBE H eight of the 21 (38%) LASM 
TST missions fired called for multiple projectiles. 
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3. Nominated Targets not Engaged. 
INT 
OLD 
For the 28 TST nominations not engaged in FBE H, the LAWS denial codes, or remarks 
in the LAWS Targeting Information, provided reasons for the target rejection in eight 
cases (see Table 2). The remarks, in LAWS, indicate the INT rejection code was used in 
cases where mensuration data were not available. In three other cases, not included in the 
table, the INT and OLD rejection codes were applied to indicate inadvertent duplicate 
nominations. A consistent and standardized definition and application of LAWS denial 
codes is needed. 
TABLE 2 
REASONS MISSION WERE NOT FIRED AS INDICATED IN LAWS 
ENGAGING TARGET 
Past Intel cutoff date I 3 
Target dwell time exceeded 1 




Target Moving 2 





4. Multiple Round Missions. 
18 3 16.7 
24 8 33.3 
15 14 93.3 
2 1 50 
In many FBE H engagements it was specified in the LAWS Firing Information that more 
than a single round was to be fired against a target. Table 3 gives the fraction of multiple 
round missions by weapon type. The data in the table includes both the MTO and TST 
missions that were fired and appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display. 
Table 3 includes 48 TST missions and 11 MTO missions. All the multiple round 
TTLAWLAM missions are MTO missions. 
TABLE 3 
FRACTION OF FIRED MISSIONS CALLING FOR MORE THAN ONE ROUND 
4.1 Rounds Actually Fired 
The LASM data are in particular illustrative of inconsistency in mission execution. Of the 
eight missions in which more than one round was required, there were only three cases 
where the requested number of rounds were fired. 
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In two cases, the requested LASMs were replaced, at least in part, by TTLAMs. For 
target number GM5032, three LASMs were specified but one LASM and one TTLAM 
were fired. For target number GM503 1 a single LASM round was requested but a single 
TTLAM round was fired. This latter mission is counted as a TTLAM mission not a 
LASM mission. 
There were also cases (GS008 1 and GS0084) where more than the requested number of 
projectiles were fired. These could be execution errors but, more likely, represent 
reengagement of targets using the same target number (see Section 4.3). 
4.2 Aim Points 
For all the cases in which multiple rounds were fired (14 ERGM, 6 LASM, 3 
TTLAMRLAM and 1 FASM), in only three cases were different aim points used for the 
individual projectiles: 
For target number GS0038 (an MTO target), three TTLAMs were fired at the same 
aimpoint one at a different aimpoint. 
For target number GS0040 (an MTO target), all four TTLAMs were fired at different 
aimpoints. 
For the GS008 1 TST mission, only one LASM round was requested but 2 TTLAMs and 
one LASM were fired, two at one aimpoint the third round at a different aimpoint. 
4.3 Multiple Rounds Engagements Result in Missing LAWS Data 
LAWS permits target reengagement using the same target number, but the LAWS 
Mission Coordination: Fires timeline reports timeline events for only one of the 
projectiles. For LASM, TLAM and TTLAM firings the individual launches are listed in 
the Mission Coordination: TLAM table but the times of the individual launches are not 
reported. This may not be a serious problem where multiple rounds are requested and 
they are fired virtually simultaneously. It is a problem when the mission is refired after a 
long interval. The Missions Coordination: Fires timeline records data for only one of the 
firings and data for the other is essentially lost. It is proposed that a unique target number 
be created for each distinct weapon firing at a target. For example, if a LASM is fired at 
target number GS4444, which is subsequently engaged with a TTLAM, the TTLAM 




When mensuration data are received at LAWS, the Circular Error (CE) and Linear Error 
(LE) values are automatically recorded in the remarks area of the targeting information. 
In the case of the San Jacinto, the JTW- LAWS communication link was not functioning, 
therefore, the mensuration data were not transmitted in an ATI.ATR message to LAWS. 
Consequently, the LAWS operator manually entered mensurated coordinates and the 
CELE data. The absence of CELE values in the LAWS Targeting Information is taken 
as evidence that the target was unmensurated. Unmensurated TST missions include the 
following: 
Of the 22 LASM missions 6 (27.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Of the 15 ERGM mission 5 (33.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Of the 9 TTLAM missions 3 (33.3%) were fired unmensurated. 
Firing of TTLAMs at unmensurated targets does not necessarily represent a procedural 
failure in that the mensurated target position can be transmitted to the in-flight missile. 
But in FBE H, only one TTLAM was retargeted and it was not one of the unmensurated 
launches. 
The great majority (82 percent) of the unmensurated firings for LASM and ERGM 
occurred on 3 1 August. 
For two of the unmensurated nominations, the JTW data log sheets (see 5.1) confirm that 
target mensuration was not performed due to the lack of Digital Point Positioning 
Database (DPPDB) data. 
5.1 JTW Data. 
JTW data were successfully collected only on the MTW and HST. Mensuration was 
performed on 36 (72%) of the 50 nominations received by those two platforms. The JTW 
data were not automatically logged. The operator manually recorded the time the request 
was received from GISRC, the time the mensurated data were sent to LAWS and the 
actual time spent mensurating the target. In most cases where the target could not be 
mensurated, it was because there were no DPPDB data for the target area (this occurred 
for 10 nominations). Table 4 contains summary data compiled from JTW data sheets 
supplied by Bruce Butts (NRO). For the two platforms that supplied mensuration data, 
the average mensuration time from the receipt of mensuration request until the data were 
transmitted was 7.9 minutes similar to the average of about nine minutes in FBE G. As 
Table 4 shows, the average mensuration time for the MTW was 6.3 minutes with zero 
time in queue. But for the HST, even on days with few requests, there were significant 
delays in the queue (average mensuration time 3.9 minutes, average receipt to send time 
8.4 minutes). The FBE H mensuration time average was somewhat reduced due to fact 
that on Aug 3 1 the HST JTW mensurated 10 targets from a single UAV image. The 
effect of that unusual circumstance on mensuration time is obvious in the August 3 1 HST 
data in Table 4. 
Figure 1 is a histogram of the intervals measured from the receipt of the mensuration 
request until the transmission of the mensurated target position. 
MTW 30 1 0 1  0 j I I 
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5.2 Missing Nominations 
A comparison of the 50 target nominations received by the JTWs on the MTW and HST 
with the target nominations reported in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display 
shows that 22 (44%) of the JTW nominations did not appear in LAWS. Further, there 
were five cases where the JTW logs state the target was mensurated but the CELE values 
indicative of a mensurated target were not reported in LAWS implying the updated 
ATI.ATR message sent from a JTW were not received at LAWS. There is at present no 
mechanism to verify the receipt of ATI.ATR messages sent between GISRC, LAWS and 
JTW. Such a mechanism is required. Missing nominations are discussed further in 
Section 7. 
6. Acquisition - LAWS Interval. 
GISRC defines the acquisition time as the time that the GISRC operator creates a track 
(or updates an existing track) of a militarily significant object. GISRC automatically 
records and logs this event. This acquisition time is included in the ATI.ATR nomination 
to LAWS and is reported in the LAWS Targeting Information. In FBE H, changes to the 
GISRC software ensured the inclusion of the acquisition time in the ATI.ATR message, 
an improvement from FBE G. 
Despite the attempted introduction of time synchronization for all systems for FBE H, 
timing problems persist. With regard to the interval between Acquisition and receipt of 
the nomination at LAWS (hereafter LAWS-ACQ) these timing problems were 
manifested in two ways: 
1. For most of Phase I of FBE H (Aug 28-3 l), the LAWS-ACQ interval for the GM and 
GC nominators (GISRC MTW and Cherry Point) averages about four minutes which 
is consistent with time estimates of GISRC operators. The LAWS-ACQ intend for 
the GS and GH nominators (GISRC San Jacinto and HST) averages about one hour 
and four minutes. It is possible that the LAWS workstations on the HST and the San 
Jacinto were reset to local time for a more easterly time zone. 
2. For the last part of the day on Aug 3 1 the LAWS-ACQ interval for several GH 
nominations was about 58 minutes (given the above assumption, this implies the 
LAWS-ACQ interval is negative for these engagements) and the interval for one 
nomination from GC was -9 minutes. This suggests LAWS and GISRC were out of 
synchronization by roughly 10 minutes. 
Accordingly, in determining the values for the ACQ-LAWS interval 60 minutes was 
subtracted from the values for GS and GH nominations and data subsequent to the 
GH0225 nomination on August 3 1 were discarded. 
For 60 TST nominations (excluding data subsequent to nomination GH0225 on Aug 3 1 
and two outliers where the interval was greater than one hour) the mean time between 
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acquisition and receipt of the nomination at LAWS was 5.15 minutes with a median time 
of four minutes. In the LAWS data, the acquire time is reported in minutes, time of 
receipt at LAWS is reported to the second but that time has been rounded to the nearest 






#OBSERVATIONS AVG. MEDIAN 
60 5.7 4 
36 9.1 6.5 
30 27.3 23 
ACQUISITION TO RECEIPT OF NOMINATION AT LAWS INTERVALS 
(times in minutes) 
Even though the total number of nominations in FBE H was much smaller than in FBE 
G, the sample size presented in the table is larger because of the changes made to GISRC 
to ensure acquire time was recorded for every GISRC initiated nomination. 
As will be discussed in Section 7, the event data from GISRC, available for the first time 
in this experiment, provided evidence that the ACQ- LAWS interval determined as 
above, is subject to a timing error. Nevertheless, the calculation was performed to provide 
a direct comparison with the data from previous experiments. 
7. GISRC Data 
Each GISRC workstation (San Jacinto, MTW, HST and Cherry Point) logged 
information for each target acquired and nominated. The GISRC data were supplied by 
Jim Burdell and Greg Bulla (SPAWAR). The GISRC data are not complete, particularly 
early in the experiment when the data logging program was being modified. The logged 
GISRC data contain 37 instances where nominations were sent to LAWS compared to the 
76 TST nominations that LAWS actually received. 
For this analysis, the first TOT time (= acquisition time), nomination time and the time 
nomination was sent were used to compute the interval between acquisition and 
nomination (ACQ-NOM), the interval between nomination and the time the nomination 
was sent to LAWS (NOM - SEND) and the total interval between acquisition and 
sending the nomination (ACQ - SEND). As Table 6 indicates, the GISRC processing 
time is predominately involved with the mechanics of preparing the nomination message 
and selecting and appending imagery to it (i.e. the NOM-SEND interval). Because the 





The GISRC median ACQ-SEND interval of five minutes (305.5 secs) should be 
compared to the value reported in Table 5 which shows the median interval between 
GISRC acquisition and receipt of the nomination at LAWS was four minutes. The two 
populations of nominations used to determine these medians are not identical so the 
values are not directly comparable, but it would be expected that if anythmg, the latter 
interval would be longer. Construction of time lines for several engagements showed 
cases for which the time that GISRC reported the nomination was sent to LAWS was 
about 50 seconds after the time that LAWS reported the nomination was received (one of 
these timelines in shown in Table 11). This appears to be another manifestation of 
unsynchronized clocks on different systems. 
ACQ-NOM NOM-SEND ACQ-SEND 
41 35 36 
162.98 384.14 515.56 
10 248 305.5 
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the ACQ-SEND interval for 36 GISRC nominations. 
Of the 37 cases where GISRC logged a nomination sent time (one reported an erroneous 
time and is not included in Table 6 or Figure 2), 11 were apparently not received by 
LAWS in that they do not appear in the LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires list. Again, a 
mechanism for confirming receipt of, and for re-sending nominations is required. 
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FIGURE 2 
HISTOGRAM OF GISRS ACQUIRE TO TRANSMIT NOMINATION INTERVAL 
(36 Observations) 
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8. LAWS - Fire Interval. 
I 
The LAWS timeline events relating to weapon firing are frequently missing and 
occasionally obviously erroneous. The transmit On call (XMT OC), and transmit when 
ready (XMT WR) fire commands and the Fired Report (FRD) randomly appear or are 
absent for the fired engagements. This was also in the case in FBE F and FBE G. Table 7 
provides the statistics on the FBE H fire times in comparison with the data collected in 
FBE F and FBE G. The data from FBE H are distinguished by the small sample size and 




INTERVALS FROM LAWS RECEIPT OF NOMINATION TO FIRE RELATED 
EVENTS 
The events in the table are: 
OC: Issuance of On Call fire command. 
WR: Issuance of When Ready fire command. 
FRD: receipt of Fired report. 
Average (AVG) and Median (MED) times are in minutes. 
The statistics reported for FBE G and FBE F exclude outlying observations where the 
intervals exceeded 90 minutes. The intervals between the receipt of the nomination at 
LAWS and the various fire related events shows no substantial change over the three 
experiments. 
Figure 3 is a histogram of the LAWS the intervals between the receipt of the target 
nomination at LAWS and the issuance of the fire when ready command. 
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FIGURE 3 
HISTOGRAM OF THE LAWS RECEIPT OF NOMINATION TO THE FIRE 
COMMAND (WHEN READY) INTERVAL 
(1 6 Observations) 
c=2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 14-16 16-18 18-20 2022 >20 
TIME (rnin.) 
9. Dwell Times. 
A table of target dwell times for use in FBE H was created by Jim Burdell (SPAWAR). 
On nominating a target, the GISRC operator selected a target type and the dwell time for 
that target type was automatically entered into the LAWS nomination message. LAWS 
does not report the dwell time, but computes and reports a NLT time that is based on the 
dwell time. In this analysis, the dwell times were recovered from the reported LAWS 
NLT times by taking the difference between the NLT time and the time the nomination 
was received at LAWS. In general, these computed dwell times corresponded with the 
tabular dwell times, for the appropriate target types, as contained in the dwell time table. 
However, particularly in the first days of the experiment, it appears some of the GISRC 
operators were manually inserting erroneous dwell times. In particular, SCUD dwell 
times were correctly found to be 30 min. for August 30 and 3 1 but on August 28 and 29 
they varied from 9 min. to 2 hrs. For these latter two days the GM nominator reported 
the correct value, but the GS and GH nominators did not. 
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10. Definition of NLT Time 
As described in Section 9, LAWS calculates the NLT time by adding the dwell time to 
the time the nomination was received at LAWS. This NLT value is an optimistic 
estimate from the perspective of the shooter, in the sense that he will be led to believe 
the target will be engageable longer than it in fact would. Often, a better approximation 
to the NLT time would be obtained by adding the dwell time to the GISRC reported 
acquisition time. However, in those cases where the target is observed to stop and the 
nomination then updated, the current NLT definition is appropriate. The treatment of 
dwell and NLT times should be reexamined and adapted to reflect the knowledge and 
status of specific targets. 
A separate issue is the play of dwell times in JSAF. JSAF has the capability of 
automatically moving or hiding a TST after the expiration of its dwell time. It should be 
ensured that this feature of JSAF is employed so that if projectiles are impacting after the 
expiration of a target’s dwell time and its consequent movement out of the projectile 
impact area, they are not being credited with a kill. 
10.1 Meeting NLT Times 
Table 8 displays the engagement NLT status as a function of dwell time. That is, was the 
target hit within the dwell time (NLT met), was the target not hit within the dwell time 
(NLT not met) or is the result uncertain (NLT met?). The latter category was applied to 
TLAM or TTLAM launches for which the interval between the LAWS fire event and 
the NLT time was less than 30 minutes or ERGM and LASM launches for which that 
interval was less than 10 minutes. The uncertainty in the actual fire time and the 
projectile time of flight means it is uncertain whether the projectile would have struck the 
target before expiration of the dwell time. The LAWS Mission Timeline Report may 
report three fire related events: transmission of the On Call (OC) fire command, 
transmission of the When Ready (WR) fire command, and the Fired Report (FRD). 
Whether these data are present or not for a fired mission is unpredictable. In the case of 
FBE H, there are many cases where the Mission Coordination: Fires and the Mission 
Coordination: TLAM displays indicate the missions were fired but the corresponding 
Mission Timeline Reports contain none of the fire related events. This circumstance is 
reflected in the “unknown” NLT status. As Table 8 indicates, all those engagements 
where the NLT time was unequivocally not met were for dwell times of 30 minutes or 
less. Table 9 contains details of the 11 fired engagements with dwell times 30 minutes 
or less for which there was some information related to the mission fire time. This table 
reports the CELE accuracy of the mensuration as reported in LAWS. A value of O/O, 
100/100 or a blank indicates that the target was unmensurated. As the table shows, the 
only two cases (GS0091, GC0067) where the dwell times were 30 minutes or less in 
which the targets were judged to have been hit within their dwell times, appear to have 
been fired unmensurated. GC0067 was an ERGM mission and the firing of five ERGMs 
may represent an attempt to compensate for the absence of mensuration. But all five 
ERGMs were targeted at the same aim point. 
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TABLE 8 
ENGAGEMENT NLT STATUS AS A FUNCTION OF DWELL TIME 
I 6 2 
90 I 13 1 2 I 4  
DWELL 1 NLT met 1 NLT met? i NLT not met 1 Unknown 'Not fired ITotals 
~ 1 I 1 
20 I 1 I I 1  
10 I 
I I 




I I Columns: I I 
DWELL: NLT time - time received at LAWS rounded to nearest minute. 
NLT met: NLT - fire time >= 30 minutes for TTLAMTTLAM, >=I0 minutes other weapons. 
NLT met ?: NLT - fire time >O and < 30 minutes for TLAMTTLAM, 4 0  minutes other weapons. 
Uknown: Mission was fired but the LAWS Timeline Report contains no fire realted events. 
Not fired. Missions that were not fired I I 
~ Time in minutes to 120, for >= 120 minutes time in hours. ~ 
I NLT not met: NLT - fire time <=O. I I j 
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TABLE 9 
Wll Wapm 1 Firer ~ TGT# lFireTmeSource CElLE INLT-FireTme/FiredCmd-LAWINLTEval Date 
I 7 I ?  28 
30 TTLAM lSANJACGsM365l OC 14.2111.91 20 , 9 I ?  29 
30 TTLAM , m o  GMoo55, OC I 6'5 I -13 42 i N 128 
301 TTLAM /DEYOiGM5021 '  OC O/O* -14 43 N 128 
20 I TTIAM 'SANJAC; Gsoo59 OC i 838.2 ~ 12 
ALL FIRED ENGAGEMENTS WITH DWELL <= 30 MINUTES AND A LAWS 
REPORTED FIRE TIME 
FkimrkS 
301 TTIAM / D c / O ' G M 5 0 3 1 I  OC 6.215.6 1 -6 35 N 
30 LASM 1 SANJACI ~ ~ 0 0 8 4  ~ FRD j 18.1/17.i -19 i 48 N 
30 ILAsMrlTwvISANJACI -32 oC(FRD) ~ 6.V5.5 l ( 4 )  I 28(69) N 
11. RPM Data. 
31 I 
31 Fired2LASM 
31 F i r e d l L A S M , I W  
A single RPM workstation located in JTASC generated routes for all the TLAM and 
TTLAM missions. The RPM workstation automatically logged the time a route request 
was received and placed in a queue, the time route processing was initiated, the time it 
was completed and the time the completed route was transmitted to LAWS. The raw 
RPM data, provided by Michael Weissenberger (Boeing), have been analyzed and the 
results are presented in the Table 10. 
3 1  ERGM ~ N J A C I G S O O ~ ~ '  ~ ( F R D )  i 
30 ERGM ISANJACI ~ ~ 0 0 8 6  FF?D 118.W17.0 
17 
20 (-14) 10 (44) N 31 
-1 30 ' N 1 3 1  
30 LASM /SANJACIGsoo91 F R D  I 27 3 , Y j 3 1  
TABLE 10 
RPM ROUTE GENERATION TIMES FOR MTO AND TST TARGETS 
(times in seconds) 
I MEDIAN TIME - RECEIPT OF REQUEST TO TRANSMIT ROUTE I 177.5 I 80 
The mean time required to compute a route for both MTO and TST missions was 83.6 
seconds. The dispersion was small as indicated by the minimum and maximum intervals 
were respectively 65 and 1 15 seconds. The total time required to process a mission was 
predominately determined by the time the route request had to wait for processing in the 
queue. This in queue interval reached as high as 960 seconds. This large value occurred 
on 28 August when three MTO missions, each requiring four TLAMs to be fired, were 
processed. The RPM work load was exacerbated by requests for extraneous routes. The 
C4IGW operator reported (LAWS IRC channel August 28, 10:02) that “RPM is getting 
MPRs for the same routes multiple times”. As an example, MTO mission GS0038 
consisted of four TLAM firings but RPM generated nine TTLAM routes. Thus, least a 
portion of the RPM workload was spurious. Nevertheless, it appears it is not difficult to 
overload, a single RPM workstation, capable only of sequential mission processing and, 
consequently, significantly extend engagement timelines. In a few cases (all Deyo or 
Ale engagements on Aug. 3 l), there were no routes generated for TLAM engagements. 
12. Digital target Folders (DTF) 
The function of the DTFs are to serve as a repository of all information relating to TSTs. 
In FBE H the DTFs received input from the following sources: 
GISRC ATI.ATR 
JTW AT1 . ATR 
BDA Manual input 
CAST creates link to preexisting target data. 
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12.1. TST DTFs 
In FBE H, 128 TST DTFs were created. Deleting those DTFs created prior to the start of 
the experiment (3 l), a total of 96 DTFs were created during Phase I of FBE H. This 
number includes the MTO targets nominated by the San Jacinto GISRC (4) and 
duplicate DTFs (16). Excluding those, there are DTFs for 82 nominated targets. This is 
very similar to the number of targets nominated in LAWS, but the targets in the two lists 
do not closely correspond. There are 46 target numbers in LAWS that do not appear in 
the DTFs and there are 21 target numbers in the DTFs that do not appear in LAWS. The 
latter figure further conforms the evidence of GISRC and JTW that not all nominated 
targets appear in LAWS. 
12.1.1. Mensuration data 
The DTF was to be automatically updated with the ATI.ATR message that JTW sent to 
LAWS and the DTF with the mensurated target coordinates. This did not appear to work 
reliably in that only 13 of the DTFs reported Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) data. 
12.1.2. BDA Data 
BDA was manually inserted into the DTF by setting the Target Status field. There were 
four states displayed in this field: Active, under engagement, attack completed, and 
destroyed. For the 82 FBE H Phase I DTFs, the number of DTFs reporting each of the 
four BDA states IS SHOWN IN Table 11. 
TABLE 11 






A comparison of specific nominations from LAWS and the DTFs indicates that the DTF 
Target Status is often not consistent with the LAWS engagement data. For example, in 
the LAWS data for 28 August there are six nominations which were not engaged but are 
listed as destroyed in the DTFs (GS0055, GM5020, GS0043, GS0044, GS0054, 
GS0037). 
12.1.3 Data Time Tags 
The DTF records the time the folder was created and the time of the last update. The 
DTF would be more valuable if each data element entered into the table were time 
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tagged. In particular, the DMPI data format provides a field named Time Mensurated but 
it was never filled. 
12.1.4 Additional Data 
The DTF is advertised as the repository of all relevant targeting data but there are many 
important gaps. There needs to be engagement data including: firing platform, weapon, 
time of fire, and impact time. Much more detail is required for BDA including time of 
BDA, source of BDA, and BDA sensor. 
12.1.5 DTF Utility 
The DTF folder was little used by FBE participants as a tool in the TST engagement 
process. This was in large part due to the inconvenience in accessing the DTF site for 
busy operators, Lack of DTF use presumably also owes something to the DTF data 
deficiencies described above. 
12.2 Deliberate Target DTF 
There were 289 DTFs for deliberate targets. After creation, these DTFs were never 
updated. They contain no BDA or mensuration data. 
13. JSAF Data 
In FBE H, none of the fire events for ERGM, LASM or TLAM for non virtual ships (e.g. 
San Jacinto and Deyo) were sent to JSAF. The San Jacinto and Deyo used ERGMs and 
LASMs to engage 77 percent of the TST targets. Accordingly, the great majority of TST 
weapons were not fired, flown out, or assessed in JSAF. The impact of this on the 
engagement timeline and, in particular, BDA is illustrated in Section 15. 
14. MTO Missions 
In FBE H, the LAWS Missions Coordination: Fires list contains some MTO missions in 
addition to the TST missions. The MTO missions, all assigned to the San Jacinto, were 
identifiable particularly on August 30 and 3 1 by remarks appearing in the LAWS 
Targeting Information identifying them as MTO targets. The other MTO targets were 
identified on the basis of the nominator (usually the San Jacinto LAWS) and the 
correspondence of the target location in the MTO with the target location reported in the 
LAWS Targeting Information. 
Between August 28 and 3 1,23 MTO engagements were assigned to the San Jacinto. Of 
those, 19 were nominated to LAWS by the San Jacinto LAWS or GISRC operators. 
Those that were not nominated lacked target positions in the MTO. Of the 19 targets 
nominated 11 were fired on. The reasons for engagement denial were listed in LAWS for 
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six of the eight targets that were not engaged, they included 4 RNG (range), 1 INT 
(intelligence), and 1 TIW (target in water). Other remarks in LAWS indicated the target 
positions were erroneous for the INT, TIW and one of the RNG missions. The MTO 
targets were not mensurated, this is explicitly stated in the LAWS remarks for some of 
the MTO targets (e.g. GS0038, GS0039, GS0040). Lack of mensuration is also indicated 
by the fact that the MTO target coordinates were almost always reported with zero 
seconds. 
Operationally, the San Jacinto would fire its few MTO missions (from one to four) the 
first thing each day and then spend the rest of the day on TST targets. There was no 
interaction between the MTO and TST processes. 
15. Data Latency 
On August 3 1 Richard Tanner (INRI) made manual measurements of the interval it took 
for a track entered at the MTW or HST to appear on GCCS-M or C2PC displays at 
JTASC and vise versa. Fourteen observations produced intervals ranging from 1.8 to 9 
seconds with mean and median of 3.9 and three seconds respectively. Although 
quantitative measurements were not made for other data latencies, a number of reports 
indicate that, at times, significant latencies existed for UAVSim video transmitted to 
GISRC and for communication of LAWS updates between the LAWS workstations. In 
constructing timelines for several engagements, in two cases (GH0209 and GH0210) it 
was found that it took more than 50 minutes for the nominations to reach LAWS and 
JTW from GISRC. Characterizing the magnitude and frequency of significant latencies 
in communications between systems in the DFN requires more complete electronic data 
capture by the various DFN systems and accurate time synchronization of those systems. 
16. A Timeline Example 
Table 12 presents a timeline for the engagement of target GM5032. This engagement 
timeline is comparatively complete and demonstrates the information potential of 
timelines. It also illustrates some of the problems the available data present in the 
construction of a complete and accurate timeline. 
This mission was fired by the San Jacinto on August 3 1 .  The mission is listed in the 
LAWS Mission Coordination: Fires display as a LASM mission but the target was first 
engaged with a TTLAM and subsequently a LASM. Both weapons were fired under the 
same target number. LAWS does not retain timeline data for multiple weapons fired with 
the same target number. Both the TTLAM and LASM firings are reported in the LAWS 
Mission Coordination: TLAM display but, unfortunately, the fire times were not reported 
there. 
The LAWS data indicate the target was mensurated but the JTW data were not collected 
on the San Jacinto and the San Jacinto JTW was not able to transmit ATI.ATR messages 
to the San Jacinto LAWS, accordingly, JTW timeline information is missing. 
The timeline exhibits the following inconsistencies and problems: 
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1. The LAWS Timeline Report indicates the nomination was received at LAWS 45 
seconds before GISRC reported it sent. 
2. The San Jacinto LAWS smtp-out log indicates the Mission Planning Request (MPR) 
was sent to the RPM 139 seconds after it was received, as logged by the RPM, and 60 
seconds after the San Jacinto LAWS smtp-in log indicates the completed route was 
received from RPM. 
3. The RPM log indicates the route data were transmitted one second after they were 
received according to the San Jacinto LAWS smtp-in log. 
4. The LAWS Timeline Fired Report for the LASM is time tagged about 20 minutes after 
the time of launch as indicated by the information in the San Jacinto observer log and 
IRC GISRC channel. 
5. IRC and San Jacinto observer logs indicate the LASM was fired prior to 1400. TOF 
would only have been a few minutes but BDA did not occur until 143 1. The need to 
manually impose target assessment and BDA (because the LASM firing was not sent to 
JSAF) required the UAV loitering in the target vicinity for about 30 minutes after the 
actual impact time. 
The excerpts from the IRC GISRC channel that appear in Table 12, relate to the tasking 
of a UAV to obtain BDA for GM5032. The GISRC channel communications do not refer 
to a target number, only the target coordinates, accordingly the relevance of these data is 









ENGAGEMENT TIMELINE FOR TARGET GM5032 
XMT OC FIRE COMMAND LAWS TIMELINE 
MPR TO RPM SAN JAC LAWS SMIP-OUT LOG 
TLAM ROUTE TO JSAF MTW LAWS SMTP-OUT LOG 
INDIGO FIRING REPORT TO JSAF MTW LAWS SMTP-OUT LOG 
FIRE TLAM, TOF 10 MINS. SAN JAC OBSERVER LOG 
TLAM AWAY. TOF 10 MINS IRC LAWS CHANNEL 
133441 
133442 ITRANSMllTED ROUTE TO LAWS I RPM LOG 






TLAM IMPACT, AWAIT BDA IRC LAWS CHANNEL 
BDA= NO EFFECT, REENGAGE LAWS COMMO LOG i i 
RETARGET, FIRE LASM SAN JAC OBSERVER LOG i i 
FIRED REPORT LAWS TIMELINE ! 
TARGET DESTROYED IRC GISRC CHANNEL 
TIME (hhmm) 
I 
IRC GISRC CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS (GM5032) 






















<MTW_GISR2> #5, please investigate 34 39 56W077 20 38W, possible movemenffstaging area 
<MTW_GISR2> #5, what do you have? 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, traffic in vicinity of 34 35N 77 17W, but looks all civilian 
<MTW_GISR2> #5 can you fly closer for a better look 
<UAV-5-6> roger 
~MTW_GISR2> #5 need BDA on 3 sets of targets visited earlier vicinity 34 34W On 15W 
<UAV-!j-6> roger, UAV5 going for BDA 
<UAV_5-6> MTW-GISR, uav5 looking at previous targets vicinity 34 34N 77 15W 
<MTW-GISR~> roger, negative BDA~ 
eMTW_GISR2> #5 those targets will be reattacked. 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, roger, standing by for BDA 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, those targets remain undamaged 
<MTW_GISR2> roger #5, stay on them 
<UAV-5-6> uav5 keeps eyes on target 1 1 
<MMI_GISR2> #5, San Jac and Deyo LASMs should be inbound 1 1 
<UAV-5-6> roger, watching 
<UAV-34> standby on BDA i these recent weapons all need manual eval - lots of concurrent evals now 
eUAV-5-6>MTW-GISR, did you copy #3 message on manual BDA process? Bottom line, standby 
<UAV-!5-6> MTW-GISR, uav5 is still standing by, you should get some BDA soon 
<MTW-GISRs> roger #5 
<UAV-5-6> MTW-GISR, uav5 reports all 3 sets of vehicles destroyed vic 34 35N 77 15W 
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17. Electronic Data Capture in FBE H 
In FBE H, improvements were made in the collection and reporting of electronic data, 
particularly for GISRC and RPM. Much however, remains to be done particularly with 
regard to LAWS and JSAF which are central to the TST process in FBEs. Table 13 
summarizes those events for which it was attempted, or would have been desirable, to 
collect data in FBE H, the success of the effort and reasons for lack of success. In 
addition to capturing the events and their associated data elements, the discussions in this 
document illustrates the problems with, and the importance of, the synchronization of the 
time stamping for all systems. 
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TABLE 13 
ELECTRONIC DATA CAPTURE IN FBE H 
~ RPM receipt of route request Y RPM loas 
RPM transmit route request Y RPM logs 
RPM time to calculate route Y RPM loas 
CST track latency P manual log CST electronic loaaing not employed. Data consist of a few manual observations 
I RC - c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  Y IRC logs 
~ ~~~ 
Time tanned chat channels to inteaer minutes. Need time tan to inteaer seconds 
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